China-Taiwan relations with the Pacific Islands have been a long-standing interest of mine. The research trip I took to Solomon Islands and Fiji was easily among my most memorable, as was chatting with Pacific Islands informants in Taipei. It’s fitting then that this first Barbarian Distinction piece is on China and Nauru’s recent announcement of official diplomatic recognition.

Nauru, “diplomatic ally”

Nauru was one of only 13 countries officially recognizing Taiwan (as the Republic of China), with the People’s Republic of China (aka China) refusing to maintain official ties with any that do. That number is down from a peak of 30 in the mid-90s to now 12:

The loss of these so-called “diplomatic allies” from 1989 to 2024 by region looks like this:

In terms of the Pacific Islands, Taiwan now has diplomatic relations with three out of a total 14 Pacific Islands states:

Old friend of the Hammer

Taiwan and Nauru have some history together. I was told that when Taipei occupied the China seat in the United Nations, it helped Nauruan leader Hammer DeRoburt’s negotiations on the termination of the trusteeship agreement ahead of Nauru’s independence in 1968. This then influenced DeRoburt’s decision to establish relations with Taipei in 1980.

Nauru has cut ties with Taiwan before, back in 2002. It then re-established relations with Taiwan in 2006. I wrote about the episode in an article on China-Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands in The Pacific Review:

An immigration-center sized budget hole

This recent episode looks to have involved less screaming and shoving. According to Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Tien Chung-kwang, China began to reach out to political figures in Nauru to induce a switch in 2023. Russ Joseph Kun was close to cutting ties last October, but there was a pause after David Adeang took the top job. As per Deputy FM Tien, Adeang asked for “a huge amount of financial aid that surpassed what Taiwan would normally provide to diplomatic allies.” An unnamed Taiwan official explained that Nauru specifically sought US$82 million to replace a funding gap due to the temporary closure of Australia’s offshore immigration detention facility on the island. An unnamed Australian official in Taiwan confirmed the report was accurate.

When Taiwan balked, an undisclosed agreement was reached with China. In return for whatever money it has promised, Beijing had Nauru not only cut ties, but also put out a statement clearly written by Beijing. The statement conceded—to an unseemly degree—Beijing’s claim to Taiwan. It also misrepresented the content of UN Resolution 2758 that accompanied the People’s Republic of China’s entry to the UN. This was profoundly ironic, as before the switch, Nauru’s endorsement of Taiwan’s sovereignty had been among the strongest in the world.

Nauru’s statement was made only two days after the results of Taiwan’s combined elections were announced. It is safe to say this was not a coincidence, as confirmed by the Global Times:

Applying a stick

Beijing considers stripping away Taiwan’s official diplomatic relationships to be one of its sticks, which in combination with various carrots, will push and pull Taiwan toward annexation (ostensibly under a “one country, two systems” formula). The 2008 to 2016 plateau in the number of such relationships was when the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou was Taiwan’s president. Beijing agreed to a “diplomatic truce” as an inducement to Taiwan’s voters to keep the KMT in power, and as it saw it, keep Taiwan on track for unification. When Gambia cut ties, reducing the “diplomatic ally” tally by one, Beijing nevertheless refused to extend recognition as a favor to Ma (I wrote about it for The Diplomat here).

Presumably this time, Beijing had Nauru all teed up. When voters again handed the DPP the presidency (presumably to Nauru’s relief), Beijing gave the go ahead.

At first glance, Nauru’s defection looks like a +1 win for China and a –1 loss for Taiwan. But the reality is more ambiguous.

Taiwan’s recent election was a mixed bag for Beijing. While the DPP still holds the presidency, it performed poorly in the legislature. It will need the cooperation of either the KMT or the new third force TPP to pass legislation. In its messaging, Beijing is highlighting that the legislative election result constitutes a restraint on the DPP’s efforts to avoid unification and shows that the mainstream of public opinion in Taiwan is not set against China’s hopes to unite the “Chinese nation.”

As dubious as these conclusions may be, Beijing doesn’t want to punish the Taiwanese public for hobbling the DPP in the legislature—or to spoil the narrative that its policy toward Taiwan is working. Also, a too strong application of the stick is likely to backfire, driving voters into the arms of the DPP.

The Nauru switch, then, is a calibrated punishment. Beijing hopes that it will disproportionately hurt the DPP relative to the KMT, and advance unification more than it hinders it.

This may not be a prudent assumption. As Lev Nachman pointed out, “poaching allies [maybe] makes the PRC look like a coercive bully more than it makes the DPP look weak.” Also there is a (probably growing) segment of Taiwan’s population who just don’t care, and are turned off by Nauru’s mercenary attitude.

Honor at stake

But Beijing’s Taiwan policy is not optimized to actually work. Its most important audience is the Chinese public, who must see the stick applied. As Shi Yinhong, director of the Center on American Studies at Renmin University said, from Beijing’s POV, it’s better to lose friends but look strong than to show weakness and threaten public legitimacy at home: “You have to make Chinese people believe that the Chinese government, the central committee of the CCP, is the best defender of China’s national interests and honor.”

The DPP winning the presidency constitutes a loss of prestige and authority for Xi Jinping and Chinese nationalism writ large. Beijing is now compelled to reduce that damage by asserting a narrative that no prestige and authority was lost. At the same time, and contradictorily, it will try to punish those responsible for that loss as the champion of China’s honor. A good example is this China Daily article referencing “netizens calling for the mainland to reunify Taiwan by force” while maintaining that everything is (irresistibly) on track.

This signaling is directed at Chinese who oppose the government as well as those lined up behind it. There is palpable unhappiness in China, particularly due to the government’s handling of Covid-19 and the current economic malaise as the investment-driven economic model runs out of puff. This found expression with Taiwan’s election, with some making fun of CCP in relation to it, and even some veiled support for Taiwan’s democracy and the DPP.

Winning the global narrative

Another target is the international community. Convincing the world that it has a legitimate claim to Taiwan, and fostering a global discourse that reinforces that legitimacy, is a tippity top-tier foreign policy concern for Beijing.

Nauru’s switch represents a marginal contribution to that. Through making the statement, through adding one more country that endorses China’s stance on Taiwan, by adding one more voice in support of China’s claim at the UN and regional forums, Nauru does make a difference.

But this should not be overstated. Not only is Nauru tiny, it has a reputation of hiring out its sovereignty to the highest bidder. That includes to Russia in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to Australia in operating a detention center for asylum seekers. This break with Taiwan has only reinforced that reputation. In effect, Nauru is debasing the value of diplomatic statements and agreements, not only its own, but in general.

Hopefully at least, the people of Nauru will see the benefit from the additional money flowing in. But there is no reason to assume the rents from this foreign policy decision will be shared equitably, or that Nauru will come out the other side wealthier than before.

In terms of marginalizing Taiwan, it doesn’t look like pro-unification Chinese taxpayers are getting good value for their money. The elections have brought affirmations of Taiwan’s sovereignty that will count more than Nauru’s negation of it. The very strong statement made by the Philippines alone more than outweighs Nauru’s statement in terms of global and regional weight.

More to come?

Time will tell if Beijing is set on chipping away more of Taiwan’s “diplomatic allies” in the short term. However, other countries looking to make a deal may not find Beijing as enthusiastic as they expect, or as Beijing hints it is:

Not only is money tight now (and the Chinese public particularly sensitive about overseas largess), too many defections would increase the chance of a counterproductive backlash from Taiwan’s public. Also, some see each “diplomatic ally” lost as a diminishment of Taiwan’s Chinese identity, something Beijing expressly doesn’t want to see:

So while Beijing “needs to follow through on with some sort of response so this might be the first of a number of measures to come,” a switch from Tuvalu for example may not be part of that. This may still be the case even if Taiwan continues to not make maintaining its “diplomatic allies” a priority.

Cold War 2.0 also gets a vote

Xi Jinping also has his relationship with the US to think about, which for the CCP is the relationship that rules them all. The US and China are currently in a cyclical period of warming, amid a secular decline in the temperature of the relationship. The Nauru switch not only represents a (minor) change to the Taiwan status quo, it also affects a region with high and growing strategic implications for China-US relations. Nauru itself is not pivotal, but Taiwan’s “diplomatic allies” Marshall Islands and Palau would be more sensitive to the US, given their proximity to Guam, Saipan, Taiwan and the Philippines.

Source: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100214244.pdf

How Xi Jinping sees the Southwest Pacific is anyone’s guess. But it would not be outlandish for Americans to think that the region falls within the scope of the profound changes not seen in a century that Xi and Putin enthusiastically agreed to drive forward together.

So far, the US has made modest efforts to bolster Taiwan’s position with its “diplomatic allies”  and in the South Pacific, as I wrote in 2022:

Taiwan and Southwest Pacific are now even more salient to the US, even with everything else going on in American foreign policy.

Australia at sea

Australia has even more at stake than the US, and certainly more than Taiwan does. As the case of the Solomon Islands brought home, the switch away from Taiwan can affect concerns about the possible future presence of Chinese naval bases as well as the direction of governance and democracy.

Canberra has painted itself into something of a corner on China and Taiwan in the South Pacific. Australia shares much of the responsibility for the hollowing out of Taiwan’s relationships. It placed considerable pressure on Taipei, including through levering its relationship with the US, to make it drop “checkbook diplomacy.” When Taiwan obliged while China stepped it up, this shift in the geopolitical landscape was inevitable.

Although it is no longer overtly hostile to Taiwan’s involvement in the region, Australia remains unwilling to act in ways that would boost Taiwan’s position for fear of upsetting Beijing or the leaders of Pacific Island countries.

However, Pacific Islanders do not see relations with Beijing as necessarily a good thing. And Pacific leaders may make decisions that are not in the best interests of their compatriots or of Australia, in which case relations are not “excellent” despite what Minister Conroy may say. I would argue a decision to enter into diplomatic relations with China for cash at the expense of Taiwan falls within that category, even while Taiwanese themselves may be glad to see Nauru go.